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DEDICATION:
THE HONORABLE CHARLES CLARK
Byron R. White*
HARLES Clark was a great judge, a great leader and administrator,
and remains what he has always been-a remarkably wise and intel-
ligent man, well-organized and very engaging. The Third Branch
will miss him very much, and I wish him and his wonderful wife, Emily, a
happy and pleasant return to private life in their native Jackson, Mississippi.
It is not the parting of every jurist that leaves such a gap in the leadership
of his peers, for Judge Clark for many years was a mighty force in the federal
judiciary on both a regional and national level. Indeed, it is likely that it will
require more than one judge to assume the many responsibilities so easily
shouldered by Judge Clark.
Charles Clark was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
on October 17, 1969, and with the division of the old Fifth Circuit in 1981,
Judge Clark found himself the new Chief Judge, a position he embraced and
made his own until his retirement. Justice Powell had been Circuit Justice
for the old Fifth Circuit, and, when the Eleventh Circuit was created, Justice
Powell's allotment fell with the States of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. I
then had the opportunity to serve as Circuit Justice for the new Fifth Cir-
cuit, to become acquainted with the judges of that circuit, and, in particular,
occasionally to see a masterful Chief Judge in action. Charles became Chief
Judge by seniority, but I had the feeling that he was the leader by the con-
sent of his colleagues. Indeed, Judge Clark's commitment to leading by ex-
ample was perhaps his most influential quality, and his dedication to
appellate duties kept the Fifth Circuit one of the most current, despite its
heavy docket. I say "perhaps" his most important quality advisedly, for his
attractive personal qualities and manner, at the same time gentle but firm,
considerate but persuasive, served him extremely well.
There have not been many setbacks in the career of Judge Clark, but I
think it appropriate to record for history at least one. During the Fall of
1990, justices of the highest courts of many nations met in Washington to
consult together. A procession in full judicial regalia took place at our
Supreme Court. The robes, and in some instances headdresses, worn by the
justices were spectacular and in stark contrast to our dull and staid black
robes worn by this nation's judges. Thereafter, Judge Clark implored his
fellow judges on the Fifth Circuit to adopt some color to wear, if not for the
entire robe, perhaps a red stole. His motion was defeated by, in his words,
* Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.
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the resistance of "hobgoblins and troglodytes." Nonetheless, Judge Clark
was later given a crimson robe of his own, to be worn on ceremonial occa-
sions before an en banc Fifth Circuit. How often this cardinal red robe was
worn prior to Judge Clark's retirement, I do not know, but I shall be inter-
ested to see whether Henry Politz, the new Chief Judge, will rise to the chal-
lenge of wearing the crimson robe on appropriate occasions.
Along with his duties on the Fifth Circuit, Judge Clark found himself on
the Judicial Conference, where his abilities as both an administrator and
leader came into sharp focus. As a member of the Judicial Conference, he
served on the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules from 1979 to 1982.
Appointed to the Budget Committee in 1980, he served as its chairman from
1981 to 1987. He also played key roles on the Committee to Study the Judi-
cial Conference from 1986 to 1987 and on the Special Committee on Habeas
Corpus Review of Capital Sentences, chaired by retired Justice Lewis Pow-
ell, from 1988 to 1989. Recognizing the need for his ability and skill as an
administrative leader, Judge Clark was appointed a member of the Executive
Committee in 1984, serving as its Chairman since 1989. He has also chaired
the Legislative Liaison Group of the Executive Committee from 1987 to
1989, taking on this role again in 1991.
Judge Clark served on the Judicial Conference Executive Committee
longer than any other member in recent history. His consistent concern for
the views of the full Conference and its presiding officer, the Chief Justice,
coupled with his dedication, wisdom and integrity combined to make his
leadership of the group an exceptional one. As well, his tenure as Budget
Committee Chairman was remarkable, occurring as it did during a time of
unprecedented judicial growth in the face of the ever-present threat of di-
minishing resources. In his role as a principal witness for the judiciary
before Congress, Judge Clark commanded the respect of the legislators and
was instrumental in earning fiscal credibility for the Third Branch. He
demonstrated a special responsibility to ensure that the judiciary request
only those funds that were required, and that these moneys be expended
wisely and without waste. When faced with the substantial cuts required of
the judiciary's budget by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings-Act, the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Judge Clark did an
extraordinary job leading the Judicial Conference through the mass of com-
plex and difficult issues which required resolution in order to satisfy budget-
ary requirements. This is but the briefest of summaries of his many
highlights on the Judicial Conference, but I find it fairly to reflect the sub-
stance of a career, not just a decade. More remarkable still, these duties
came in addition to those normally assigned to busy circuit court judges, and
surely Judge Clark's cases never suffered.
Charles Clark takes with him a unique stature earned through long years
of dedicated service, and I am sure that his advice will frequently be sought.
All who have had the pleasure of working with him have benefitted immea-
surably from his friendship, counsel, and his significant contributions to the
federal judicial system. And the country owes him a great debt of gratitude.
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A TRIBUTE TO CHARLES CLARK
Thomas Gibbs Gee*
A Knyght ther was and that a worthy man
That fro the tyme that he first began
To riden out, he loved chivalrie
Trouthe and honour, freedom and curtesie.
And though that he ware worthy, he was wys,
and of his port as meeke as is a mayde,
He never yet no vileynye ne sayde
In al his lyf, unto no maner wight,
He was a very parfit, gentil knyght.
- Chaucer, Prologue to The Canterbury Tales
N January 15 of this year, after twenty-two years of service, Charles
Clark of Jackson retired as Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit to re-
enter the practice of law with Watkins & Eager, a distinguished firm
of that city; and the United States lost an incomparable public servant - not
for the first time. For public service was a passion with the Chief, who
served Mississippi, his native state, in various capacities over the years and
completed two separate tours of wartime duty with the United States Navy
in 1943-46 and 1951-52.
If form follows function, then Charles Clark was born to be a Judge, in-
deed, a Chief Judge. For Charles looks like a judge, from the top of his
silvery hair to the tip of his toes - a quality not be underestimated in deal-
ing with Congressional Committees, as he so often had to do. But his ap-
pearance, perfect as it was, formed the least of his qualifications for the role.
I have been privileged to know the last eight Chief Judges of the Circuit,
and to serve with or under seven of them: Judges Hutcheson, Rives, Tuttle,
Brown, Coleman, Godbold, Clark and Politz - a goodly number, each of
whom had (or has) his peculiar and discrete strengths as Chief Judge.
Charles had many; and they are well set out in the opening quote from
Chaucer save for one, and that the chief of all: his profound devotion to
duty and his serious, effective, and indefatigable efforts to discharge it fully
and well.
Whatsoever his hand found to do, he did it with his might, without com-
plaint and without advertisement. During the latter years of his Chief
Judgeship, as I have better reason than most to know, he was carrying the
* Of Counsel, Baker & Botts; Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
(Ret.). B.S. 1946, The United States Military Academy; LL.B. 1953, University of Texas.
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work of three people: Active Judge, Chief Judge, and Chairman of the Exec-
utive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States. As Sched-
uling Proctor, with major (though not exclusive) responsibility to the Court
for assigning its straight judicial work, I importuned the Chief for years to
take a reduced load, in view of his other and heavy responsibilities. I have
seldom enjoyed smaller success at any task, and this while he was serving in
the second most important administrative office in the entire federal judici-
ary, after the Chief Justice of the United States! Few grasped the monumen-
tal nature of his efforts, for each of his roles was played out before a
somewhat difference audience: as a judge, to his colleagues, the other Cir-
cuit Judges; as Chief, to his colleagues, to the district judges, bankruptcy
judges, magistrate judges, and to the many - clerks, marshals and others -
serving the Court in one capacity or another throughout the Circuit; as
Chairman of the Executive Committee, to the entire federal judiciary and its
support functionaries - plus, sometimes, the Congress. He did all effec-
tively, and with unfailing grace and courtesy.
It is said that the most telling insult is one that is spontaneous, unaffected,
and sincere. By a parity of reasoning, the truest compliment is one that was
never meant to reach its object's ear. Some months after leaving the bench, I
was asked by one of the Firm's major clients to comment on a panel of the
circuit to which a very large appeal was shortly to be argued. Charles was
on the panel; here is what I - duty-bound to candor and sure that he would
never hear my words - then wrote about him:
A splendid judge, the leader of the Court in most senses. Intelligent;
can be a very aggressive questioner. Tends to make up mind early.
Views generally moderate, but unpredictable, original, and occasion-
ally mildly off-beat.
A moderate to conservative Democrat of the Southern school and a
gentleman of the Old one.
Evenhanded, leans to neither side.
He was a very parfit, gentil Knyght.
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CHARLES CLARK
Henry A. Politz *
HAT comes to mind when one thinks of Charles Clark, former
longtime Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit? The answer which comes to my mind, and
probably the mind of all who have been fortunate enough to have served as a
judicial colleague, is an image of the consummate judge. The bearing, car-
riage, attentiveness, wisdom, fairness, and response one assigns to the quin-
tessential jurist were present in abundance in Charles Clark.
His twenty-two years of service have been exceeded by a number of other
judges; his ten-plus years as the Chief Judge of his circuit have been ex-
ceeded by a very few; his devotion to duty and judicial integrity have been
matched but exceeded by none. While authoring over 2,800 opinions for the
court of appeals and serving on the Judicial Conference of the United States
for over ten years, the last three of which he served as Chairman of the
Executive Committee of the Conference, and routinely volunteering to serve
in a district court in the circuit experiencing either an episodic work over-
load, or a shortage of trial judges, or both, he ever maintained a calmness of
bearing and being which signalled to all that everything that needed to be
done would be done, would be done exceedingly well, and would be done in
short order.
Charles Clark's accomplishments as a member of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Judicial Circuit will long serve as a standard against
which to measure the performance of appellate judges. He also has set a
formidable standard and worthwhile goal indeed for all who now serve and
hereafter will be fortunate enough to be selected for service. That some may
match it is much to be desired.
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

To RETIRED CHIEF JUDGE CLARK
Edith Jones*
UTHORITY and stature are not synonymous; their convergence in
a leader is a blessing to his colleagues and the nation he has served.
Charles Clark acquired authority upon assuming the federal bench
in 1969. His authority grew when he became Chief Judge of our circuit on
October 1, 1981. As Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Judicial
Conference of the Untied States, a position created by the Chief Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, Chief Judge Clark's authority assumed
national scope and responsibility. But his stature among his fellow Fifth
Circuit judges transcends his authority and should outlive even his formida-
ble contributions to the administration of justice. I hope in a few words to
"lay on your hearts," as Chief Judge Clark would say, some of the reasons
for his stature.
Charles Clark is and will remain beloved among us for his character and
(dare one say it in these secular times) his Biblical leadership qualities. More
than a chief judge, he was an exemplar of fairness, diligence, I collegiality 2
and modesty. 3
It may seem trite to commend a judge for his sense of fairness. Yet the
tendency of our popular press is to sketch public figures, including judges, as
no more than ideological cartoons. Deliberate stereotyping of this sort is not
only wrong but dangerous, for it suggests and encourages the belief that the
law is a pawn of whatever interests have the power to move it about. Fortu-
nately, law is not yet so inconsistent or ineffectual, and the vast majority of
judges do not treat it so. For Charles Clark, it has been the law, not his
predilections, that guided his decisions. He applied superior legal talents
and scrupulous attention to the record on appeal to determine the correct
result of a case demanded by the applicable law. Understanding the power
of law, Charles still had a healthy respect for its limits. I infer from observ-
ing Charles's approach that his concept of federal law is that it best suits
society when framed clearly and as simply as possible. Thus, his writing is
neither pretentious nor portentous but comes to the point in a lean, crisp
manner. To Charles Clark, I believe, fairness inheres in preserving neutral
rules that may be understood and applied by all parties. Federalism aug-
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
1. See, e.g., 2 Thess. 3:8-9 (NAS) ("[w]ith labor and hardship we kept working night and
day so that we might not be a burden to any of you; ... in order to offer ourselves as a model
for you.").
2. See, e.g., 1 Thess. 5:13 (NAS) ("Live in peace with one another.").
3. See e.g., I Thess. 5:5-6 (NAS) ("For we never came with flattering speech, . . . nor did
we seek glory from men .... ").
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ments this concept of fairness, because it preserves the accountability and
responsibility of state officials while being elastic enough to adapt to society's
changing needs. 4 One might differ occasionally with Charles Clark's results
or reasoning, but his judicial integrity, animated by the principles I have
noted, is impeccable.
Diligence may be too mild an adjective for Charles Clark's work habits.
Whether he was born diligent or became so as his administrative duties arose
on top of ordinary judicial responsibility, I do not know. But his wife and
staff uniformly attest that the Chief was never idle. Unlike a compulsive
workaholic, however, Charles spared time for his large family and hobbies
like fishing and bird watching. Surely these activities were rejuvenating, a
necessary offset to the frequent travel, the supervisory responsibilities, the
personnel problems and the truly incessant flow of paperwork that charac-
terize modern judicial administration. Through it all, Charles Clark main-
tained a full judicial workload on our court and was as prompt and thorough
in deciding cases as his less-burdened colleagues.
The Chief's qualities that are subsumed within the term collegiality are
both difficult to describe to one outside the court and yet most noteworthy in
his character. Succinctly, Charles Clark's leadership exhibited self-restraint
and open-mindedness to each one of his colleagues--qualities not always
easily maintained. A good appellate judge should be independent and suffi-
ciently self-confident to challenge a colleague's position when the occasion
demands. A good chief judge umpires disputes and in so doing may have to
suppress his strongly held views for the sake of maintaining harmony on the
court. Without harmony, or collegiality among the judges, the coherence of
the court's decisions becomes threatened. Charles Clark's tenure was
marked by significant changes in court membership, the strain of an explod-
ing Fifth Circuit docket, and dramatic clashes of opinion in some notewor-
thy cases. In the face of these potentially destabilizing events, the Chief's
evenhandedness and openness remained unwavering. With his leadership,
we soldiered on as a court-our productivity and, one hopes, the quality of
our work enhanced by the collegiality Charles Clark encouraged. He sent us
a beautiful letter on January 15, 1992, his last day on the court, and de-
scribed among other things his pride "in knowing that our work knit justice
and order into the fabric of our government." It is difficult if not impossible
for a court to adorn the fabric of government if the bench is riven with strife.
The Chief should be proud of bestowing a legacy of collegiality on a worthy
successor, Chief Judge Politz.
The last virtue that I commend in Charles Clark is modesty. Life-tenured
judges must often struggle against the overweaning ego, yet I have never
heard him utter a prideful or boastful remark. Courtesy and empathy char-
acterized his dealings with his office staff and court personnel; he did not
attune his behavior to a person's social or political status. An engaging
storyteller, he as often as not became the butt of his own colorful anecdotes.
4. See Charles Clark, The Role of National Courts in 200 Years of Evolving Governance,
18 CuMB. L. REV. 95 (1987).
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Modesty overcame him in a law review in which he suggested: "Ignorance
... requires that I leave such esoteric deliberations [on the future of federal-
ism] to my betters."5 His article went on to summarize three particular
ways in which federal-state judicial relations have gone awry and to propose
neat solutions to the problems. The disclaimer was as unfeigned as it was
refuted by the clarity and persuasiveness of his arguments. Charles Clark
maintained his wholesome sense of proportion despite being chief judge and
a preeminent spokesman and advocate for the entire federal judicial branch.
Lest Charles, whose continued friendship I value, should be too embar-
rassed by this encomium, I close by reminding the reader, in Charles Clark's
words, why we laud him:
It is fitting [to honor departed or senior judges] because many tend to
think of the court as those in active service whose names and faces they
see most often. This is a mistake. Tradition and stare decisis make us a
unique continuum. Neither the intelligence nor the industry of today's
active judges has acquired the image that this court bears. What we are
perceived to be, is built on a foundation laid by those who have served
before us. The rich legacy that they have bequeathed to this institution
not only established its reputation, but also challenges us to continued
accomplishment. 6
5. Clark, supra note 4, at 97.
6. Remarks of Chief Judge Clark upon presentation of the formal portraits of Judges
Ainsworth, Brown, Wisdom, Thornberry, Coleman, Goldberg, Ingraham and Garza, 767 F.2d
CXVII (Feb. 7, 1985).
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CHIEF JUDGE CHARLES CLARK AND
COURT ADMINISTRATION
Paul H. Roney*
OST judges accept appointment to a court to decide cases, write
opinions, and be involved with the development of the law. They
are not interested in court management. Since so much of court
management impacts on the judicial responsibility of Article III courts,
however, judges must retain control of court administration in order to
maintain the judiciary's independence from the other two branches of fed-
eral government. As Chief Judge Joseph Hutchinson once observed: "the
administration of justice is justice."
Chief Judge Charles Clark, while carrying a full load of judicial work dur-
ing his twenty-two years on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, prior to his retirement January 15, 1992, was a major figure in the
administration of the federal courts, doing excellent work in several different
roles.
A short review of court administration and the several organizational bod-
ies involved points up the various capacities in which Judge Clark impacted
the work of the federal courts.
Initially, the provision of space, furniture, office equipment, supplies, per-
sonnel, and other support that did not involve traditional judicial powers
was handled chiefly through the Justice Department. In 1939, in order to
remove this activity from the oversight of this major litigant in the federal
courts, Congress provided for different entities within the judiciary to handle
these things, as well as to be concerned with when and where court would be
held, calendaring of cases, record keeping, assignment of judges, priorities
and other similar matters which generally involve traditional judicial
powers.
These are the agencies or organizations now concerned with court admin-
istration: the Judicial Conference of the United States, Judicial Councils of
the Circuits, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Fed-
eral Judicial Center, and the Judicial Conference of the Circuits. These enti-
ties and the courts, teamed with each other, embrace all of the
responsibilities encompassed in the definition of court administration with
two major exceptions: (1) budgetary constraints are imposed by Congress,
and (2) the furnishing of space, furniture, and fixtures is a joint responsibility
with the General Services Administration.
* Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
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THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES is presided over by
the Chief Justice of the United States and includes the chief judge of each
judicial circuit, the chief judge of the Court of International Trade, and a
district judge from each judicial circuit. There are now thirteen judicial cir-
cuits, including the District of Columbia Circuit and the Federal Circuit.
The Conference thus has a membership of 27 judges. The statutory duties of
the Conference are to (1) survey the business of courts and prepare plans for
inter-district and inter-circuit assignment of judges, (2) make recommenda-
tions to the various courts to promote uniformity of management procedures
and expeditious conduct of the court business, (3) continually study the rules
of practice and procedure in the courts and recommend changes to the
Supreme Court, and (4) to carry out certain responsibilities under the Judi-
cial Discipline Act. The Conference meets two times a year, and does most
of its work through committees.
Chief Judge Clark automatically became a member of the Conference on
October 1, 1981, when he became Chief Judge upon the split of the old Fifth
Circuit into two circuits: the reformed Fifth and the new Eleventh Circuits.
By the time he resigned, no current member of the Conference had been on
the Conference when he joined it.
Appointed in each instance by the Chief Justice of the United States,
Judge Clark has served on several important committees of the Conference.
Under Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, he was appointed to the Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules from 1979 to 1982. He became a member of
the influential Budget Committee in 1980, and served as its chairman from
1981 to 1987.
When Chief Justice William Rehnquist took office, he appointed Chief
Judge Clark to a small committee to study and recommend changes in the
operation of the Judicial Conference. As a result of the report of that com-
mittee, several changes were instituted which increased measurably the effi-
ciency of the Conference and its committees. More authority was given to
the Committees of the conference and substantial authority was delegated to
an Executive Committee.
Judge Clark was named a charter member of Justice Rehnquist's Execu-
tive Committee in 1984, and served as its Chairman from 1989 until his
resignation on January 15, 1992, by which time he had served longer than
any other member. He was made Chairman by this committee of several
judges to act as a Legislative Liaison Group. He had testified several times
before congressional committees in presenting the budget, and he continued
to testify about a variety of judicial legislation.
The Executive Committee fixes the agenda for the Conference meetings,
all items having been generally thoroughly processed previously through the
committees and permanent staff of the Administrative Office. It makes innu-
merable decisions on behalf of the Conference in the interim between
meetings.
Since 1989, the Chief Justice has asked Judge Clark to preside over por-
tions of every Conference session. Such was his confidence in Judge Clark
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that he appointed him to the controversial Special Committee on Habeas
Corpus Review of Capital Sentences, which, under the chairmanship of Re-
tired Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., had a mandate from Con-
gress to report ways for improving the chaotic procedures for federal review
of capital cases.
During this period, Judge Clark was commonly considered the second
most influential policy making judge in the country as to judicial administra-
tion and court management, only the Chief Justice having greater power and
influence.
Generally little publicity is given to the work of the Judicial Conference,
probably due to the stature of its members and presiding officer and several
operational facts: its meetings and the meetings of its committees are closed
to the public, a committee's report usually lacks independent authority, and
the practical influence of the Conference and the Chief Justice extend far
beyond the statutory mandate.
A JUDICIAL COUNCIL for each judicial circuit, the geographical divisions
made when the Courts of Appeals were created in 1891, has been established
by statute. A Council has the responsibility to make all necessary and ap-
propriate orders for the effective and expeditious administration of justice
within its circuit, and to investigate disciplinary complaints against judges,
with some limited power of discipline. The composition of a Judicial Coun-
cil varies from circuit to circuit, as permitted by statute. The Fifth Circuit
Council consists of the Chief Judge, nine circuit judges and nine district
judge representatives, one from each district within the circuit. This even
mix of appellate and trial judges on the Council was initiated by Judge Clark
and highly favored by the district judges.
Each Council appoints a Circuit Executive to exercise such administrative
powers and perform such duties as might be delegated by the Circuit Coun-
cil and certain statutory duties. All work of the Circuit Executive is under
the general supervision of the Chief Judge. Through his style of administra-
tion, Chief Judge Clark relied heavily on his Circuit Executive for adminis-
trative duties.
Acting under its statutory direction to "submit suggestions and recom-
mendations to the various courts," the Judicial Conference from time to
time passes resolutions which give the Circuit Judicial Councils specific re-
sponsibilities and projects concerning particular management problems.
Thus, Judge Clark would be on both the sending end of such directions, as a
member of the Judicial Conference, and on the receiving end, as chief ad-
ministrative judicial officer of the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, super-
vised by a Director appointed by the Chief Justice, after consulting with the
Judicial Conference, has sweeping powers and responsibilities for all aspects
of court administration: it prepares and executes the judiciary budget, sup-
plies, housing, furniture and fixtures, office equipment and supplies, person-
nel, record keeping and paper flow, excepting only scheduling court sessions,
calendaring cases, and assigning judges. The Director's responsibility, act-
1992]
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ing under the supervision of the Judicial Conference, brings him into sharp
conflict with the inherent supervisory authority of the courts and the judges
from time to time. The fiscal responsibilities of the Director probably create
the greatest tension. Chief Judge Clark was the foremost representative of
the judges and the courts to the Administrative Office because of his Chair-
manship of the Budget and Executive Committees. He developed an easy
working relationship with the Administrative Office largely due to his own
personality and the knowledge and competence he brought to this work.
Such has been Judge Clark's relationship with staff and Congress that Mr.
Ralph Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office, said on Clark's retire-
ment: "Chief Judge Clark is a true 'judicial statesman' of the first rank and
he is surely one of a handful of administrative leaders of the Judiciary over
the past decade."
The Federal Judicial Center was created in 1967, largely under the aus-
pices of then retired Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark. The Center is given
four statutory areas within which to function: (1) research, (2) recommen-
dations to the Judicial Conference concerning administration of federal
courts, (3) continuing education and training of judges and court personnel,
and (4) the provision of staff assistance to the Judicial Conference and its
committees. Administered by a seven person Board, the Chief Justice, as
Chairman, and the Director of the Administrative Office are permanent
members.
Because of the diffuse areas of certain matters of common concern, juris-
dictional disputes would develop from time to time between the staffs of the
Judicial Center and the Administrative Office. Judge Clark's innate good
sense and practical wisdom served to minimize and help resolve many of
these conflicts.
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE JUDICIAL CIRCUIT was created to
bring together all of the judges in the circuit, trial and appellate, with repre-
sentative members of the bar, to consider the business of the courts and ad-
vise means of improving the administration of justice within the circuit. The
extent to which any Circuit Judicial Conference fulfills its statutory purpose
is the responsibility of the Chief Judge.
Early in his administration, Chief Judge Clark fostered the creation of the
Bar Association of the Fifth Federal Circuit. By the time of his retirement
there were 4,000 members. This association of lawyers was given significant
responsibilities to assist the Circuit Executive with arrangements for the an-
nual meeting of the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference. It was Chief Judge
Clark's thought that the statutory function of the Circuit Judicial Confer-
ence would best be carried out at the hands of the lawyers and staff, freeing
the judges' time for judicial matters. Judge Clark also delegated many other
responsibilities to this Bar Association, such as nominating members of the
bar to serve on the Court Rules Advisory Committee and on the Library
Fund Liaison Committee, which supervises expenditures of the discretionary
funds generated by fees for admission to practice before the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
[Vol. 46
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It is safe to say that everyone in the federal judicial system regretted Chief
Judge Clark's resignation: The Chief Justice of the United States, who relied
so much upon Judge Clark for court administration matters; the members of
the Judicial Conference, who had learned to depend upon his resourceful
knowledge and guiding wisdom; the Director of the Administrative Office,
the most influential non-judge in the court system, who had a pleasant and
fruitful professional relationship with one whose competence he greatly ad-
mired; the staffs of the Administrative Office and Federal Judicial Center,
who knew him as a person of good intent and integrity; the lawyers who
practice in the Fifth Circuit, with whom Judge Clark had developed a com-
fortable partnership in court administrative matters; and most of all, the
Judges and Staff of his own court, who perceived him as an administrator
who could effectively delegate, and get the job done, willing to rely upon the
competence of others.

TRIBUTE TO CHIEF JUDGE
CHARLES CLARK
Thomas C Wright*
HARLES Clark's retirement from the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit surprised the author of this article very
much. Judge Clark looks, acts, and talks like the judge every lawyer
would envision if asked the question "what makes a great judge?"
This is a Tribute to the judge. It canvasses more than 2,800 Clark opin-
ions but discusses in detail only a few selected by the author. Judge Clark
did not aid in the selection of the opinions discussed, declining, predictably,
to "choose among his children."
The first section of this Tribute concentrates on the various aspects of
Judge Clark's approach-his style, his treatment of precedent, his treatment
of lower courts and administrative agencies, and his administration. The
second part addresses the judge's more important opinions on various topics
of substantive law.
I. STYLE
Judge Clark generally has a straight-forward, pragmatic style in his opin-
ions. He objected when the en banc majority characterized the defendant
lenders as " 'credit wolves' dressed in 'sheeps clothing.' "I According to
Judge Clark, "[t]hese pejoratives obscure the economic realities and legal
issues that ought to govern these cases."' 2 Likewise, he objected when the
majority referred to the litigants as "David and Goliath. '" 3 As every trial
lawyer knows, one difficulty of using metaphors arises when the opposing
lawyer cleverly twists the metaphor, making the first lawyer cringe. This
trap, coupled with Judge Clark's concern that the litigants believe the court
took their case seriously, explains the general lack of metaphors, literary
allusions, and the like in Judge Clark's opinions. It certainly was not a lack
in the efforts of his clerks to write something clever! His style could be quite
* Attorney, Brown Campbell Harrison & Wright. It would hardly be fair to the reader
to not disclose the great admiration I have for Chief Judge Clark. I served as one of his law
clerks from 1980-1981. I named my firstborn son after him and Professor Charles Alan
Wright. In fact, this Tribute is an update and a rewrite of a paper I wrote for Professor Wright
in my last year of law school.
1. Williams v. Public Finance Corp., 598 F.2d 349, 361 (5th Cir. 1979) (Clark, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part).
2. Id.
3. Harris v. Amoco Production Co., 768 F.2d 669, 686 (5th Cir. 1985) (Clark, J.,
concurring).
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powerful in the absence of literary devices. For example, in rejecting the
Veterans Administration's claim that a veteran died from a service-con-
nected heart disease when in fact he died on the operating table, Judge Clark
noted bluntly: "[w]hile that disease may have necessitated the surgery, he
died because a negligent member of the staff of the... Veterans Administra-
tion Hospital cut his heart and aorta open with a saw."'4
Judge Clark's opinions were no longer than necessary. Indeed, he has
expressed his reluctance to dissent over unimportant issues. 5 He has also
criticized the court when its opinion was too cryptic to be understood. 6
The opinion of Judge Clark in United States v. Chiantese7 seems to be an
anomaly. It contains puns and alliteration that are more characteristic of
the opinions of Judge Irving Goldberg or Judge Brown.8 Humor is rare in a
Clark opinion, and when it is there it is wry. In a dissent from a panel
majority that relied heavily on the testimony of the plaintiff's expert Martin
Malarkey, Judge Clark criticized the majority for failing to analyze the is-
sues and for choosing "to rely only on the theoretical testimony of the plain-
tiff's aptly named expert to create a series of presumptions."9
Appeals to common sense practicalities and to consideration of the "real
world" are not uncommon in his opinions.' 0 Once, I was faced with re-
searching an odd legal point. The district court had excluded some very
critical evidence on the express ground that it would be "misleading [to] the
jury" under Federal Rule of Evidence 403."1 The difficulty was that it had
been a non-jury trial. I told Judge Clark I was having trouble finding a case
on point in the digest. He said "try looking under common sense."
II. TREATMENT OF PRECEDENT
Judge Clark does not avoid precedents that he disagrees with. He has
chided fellow judges for creating obscure distinctions in order to get around
Supreme Court precedent.' 2 He prefers to confront inconsistent precedent
directly by either modifying it or overruling it.' 3 He adheres to the rule
making panel decisions binding on subsequent panels, even when he would
overrule the precedent on rehearing en banc. In one case he adhered to a
4. Greenwood v. United States, 858 F.2d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir. 1988).
5. Trawick v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of New York, 484 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973).
6. Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 425 F.2d 1211, 1217 (5th Cir. 1970).
7. 560 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1977).
8. See Carroll v. Secretary of H.E.W., 470 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1977); Pelotto v. L&N
Towing Co., 604 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1979).
9. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226, 238 (5th Cir. 1983) (Clark,
J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom, Gulf Coast Cable Television Co. v. Affiliated Capitol
Corp., 474 U.S. 1053 (1986).
10. See Texas Employers Ins. Assn. v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 509 (5th Cir. 1988); Rum-
mel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 666 (5th Cir. 1978); Winters v. Cook, 466 F.2d 1393, 1401 (5th
Cir. 1972); afl'd, 489 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973).
11. FED. R. EVID. 403.
12. See, Maness v. Wainwright, 512 F.2d 88, 93 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 893
(1976), cert. dismissed, 430 U.S. 550 (1977).




1942 panel precedent he thought was unwise. 14
For Judge Clark, the time for doing away with precedent is when the
court sits en banc. Judge Clark is not afraid to confront and overrule prece-
dent at the appropriate time: the controlling precedent of In re Evans
"should be modified and this is both the time and forum for it." 15
Adherence to the panel-precedent rule means reversal of a prior panel de-
cision is a laborious process. Judge Clark followed that process in 1987 in
Lirette v. N.L. Sperry Sun, Inc. 16  On February 23, 1987, he released the
panel opinion that criticized a 1973 panel opinion. 17 He pointed out that the
panel's decision was dictated by precedent, noting that "[w]e reach the result
we do only because as a panel we are bound by Gamble [v. Central of Geor-
gia Railway].""8 Judge Clark apparently initiated the rehearing poll imme-
diately, and a rehearing was granted March 2, 1987.19 The en banc court
issued a short unanimous opinion by Judge Clark overruling the prior prece-
dent and remanding the case to the panel.20 The panel was then freed from
the constraints that they had faced before, and reached the result that they
had previously decided was best.2 1 This process, though circuitous, was ac-
complished in just nine months. 22
Judge Clark considers public confidence in the judicial system important.
In Bart v. Department of Justice23 , Judge Clark, designated to sit on the D.C.
Circuit to review a claim for records under the Freedom of Information
Act, 24 ordered disclosure of a portion of a document in which a district
judge, under investigation by the FBI, expressed support for that agency. 25
"[E]ven the possibility that Judge Pratt could have intended to reveal a bias
raises a significant issue of public concern. Judicial impartiality is essential
to the integrity of the nation's courts." '26
Similarly, Judge Clark wrote a concurring opinion in an en banc case de-
nying probable cause to appeal in a habeas corpus claim from a death sen-
tence. 27 Judge Clark wrote out of his concern that extended review
processes in criminal cases "produces a public perception of injustice which
carries the portent to undermine the foundation of our system of law."' 28 He
urged the court to adopt procedures so that "in each instance capital punish-
ment [would] be imposed with maximum assurance of scrupulous legality,"
14. White Castle Lumber and Shingle Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir.
1973) (Clark, J., concurring).
15. Dinitz, 538 F.2d at 1226.
16. 820 F.2d 116, 117 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
17. 810 F.2d 533, 538-40 (5th Cir. 1987).
18. Id. at 538.
19. Lirette v. N.L. Sperry Sun, Inc., 812 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1987).
20. Lirette v. N.L. Sperry Sun, Inc., 820 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1987).
21. 831 F.2d 554, 555 (5th Cir. 1987).
22. See United States v. Hurtado, 905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990).
23. 665 F.2d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
24. Id. at 1251-52.
25. Id. at 1255-56.
26. Id. at 1255.
27. Brogdon v. Butler, 824 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1987).
28. Id. at 343 (Clark, J., concurring).
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on the one hand, and that "the punishment be imposed when the minds of
men still retain memory of the crime committed."'29 Otherwise, he con-
cluded, "capital punishment becomes a sort of second, albeit legal, crime." 30
III. DEFERENCE TO AGENCIES AND TRIAL COURTS
Charles Clark believes in giving lower courts and agencies the deference
they deserve, but no more. He dissented where a panel majority failed to
give administrative findings the presumption of correctness they are entitled
to3l and wrote for an en banc majority to give deference to administrative
practice. 32 The Judge criticizes administrative practice when necessary. In
one particularly objectionable case,3 3 the IRS was attempting to exact taxes
from a wife for her half of her husband's income, to which she was entitled
under Louisiana law. Since husband and wife were separated when the hus-
band earned the income and the wife never knew about the money, Judge
Clark wanted to extend the majority's remand to "insist that the substance
of reality mandates that this federal harassment merely to enforce the techni-
cal form of State civil law must stop forthwith."' 34
While it is rare for a judge to write a dissenting opinion in a case involving
the denial of a motion for rehearing, Judge Clark did just that in Hall v.
FER C. 35 His dissent is not addressed to the merits of the case, but instead
gives unique insight into significant matters of judicial administration. The
Advisory Committee on Codes of Conduct had opined that even a fractional
mineral interest that could be affected by a FERC proceeding was a disquali-
fying interest. Nine active judges on the Fifth Circuit disqualified them-
selves in the Hall case. 36 In response to these disqualifications in FERC
cases, the court, under Judge Clark's leadership, administratively formed a
special panel of judges who would not be disqualified to hear those appeals
- the "Gas Panel." 37 That panel eventually dwindled to three. As Judge
Clark points out in his dissent, it was therefore impossible to get an en banc
rehearing in a FERC case. 38
Judge Clark wrote nineteen published opinions in FERC cases in the last
decade. The FERC's orders did not fare well in these opinions. Judge
Clark's view is typified by his opinion in Shell Oil Co. v. FERC 39 There he
wrote: "Our inquiry into administrative actions is limited. But an agency
must at the very least provide support for critical facts underlying its deci-
29. Id. at 344 (Clark, J., concurring).
30. Id.
31. Reddy, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 492 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1974) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
32. Fredericks v. Kreps, 578 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1978).
33. Bagur v. C.I.R., 603 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1979).
34. Id. at 503.
35. 700 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983).
36. Id. at 218.
37. Id. at 219 (Clark, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. 707 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983).
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sions.... Without this, judicial review of agency decisions is impossible."4°
The court vacated FERC's orders and remanded for further proceedings.
4 1
The same result was reached in at least four other FERC cases. 42 In one of
those cases, the FERC had failed to apply the court's ruling in a previous
remand.4 3 Judge Clark signalled his displeasure by beginning the opinion,
"[1]ike the proverbial bad penny, the instant dispute is back in our Court
again." 44 Three other FERC orders were simply reversed.
4 5
The FERC achieved at least one major victory in Transwestern Pipeline
Co. v. FERC.46 There, Judge Clark wrote an opinion upholding FERC or-
ders 238 and 238-A, which eliminated the fixed-cost portion of the pipelines'
minimum bills and, together with Order 380, sent the interstate natural gas
pipeline business into a tailspin. 47
Trial courts are entitled to deference as well. Judge Clark objected both to
reversing trial judges when they made reasonable determinations 48 and to
criticizing trial judges when their departure from ordinary procedure was
agreed to by both parties.49 The Judge, however, does reprove trial judges
that overstep their authority, such as the trial judge who ordered the State of
Texas to stop construction on its highways. 50 And Judge Clark issued a
strongly worded dissent when the district court referred a civil case to a
magistrate over one party's objection. 5 1 The en banc majority found that
this did not create a jurisdictional defect. 52 Judge Clark was livid as his
dissent shows:
The magistrate was as much a legal stranger to the judicial process that
determined the outcome of this proceeding as would have been a by-
stander called in from the street. Is this "close enough for government
work?" Must this court be blind to the error if the parties do not bring
it to our notice? I think not. 53
In an asbestos-illness case, 54 Judge Clark addressed a claim that the dis-
trict court had prejudiced the jury by its comments. The appellate court had
already opined that it was going to reverse for a new trial, but Judge Clark
40. Id. at 235 (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 236.
42. Fritz v. FERC, 876 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1989); Florida Gas Trans. Co. v. FERC, 876
F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1989); Hunt Oil Co. v. FERC, 853 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1988); Fort Pierce
Utility Authority v. FERC, 724 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir. 1984).
43. Hunt Oil Co. 853 F.2d at 1226.
44. Id. at 1228. Perhaps the judge meant "like the proverbial tennis ball."
45. E.P. Operating Co. v. FERC, 876 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1989); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v.
FERC, 677 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1982); L&B Oil Co. v. FERC, 665 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1982).
46. 820 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1987).
47. Id. at 746-747.
48. Hennigan v. Chargers Football Co., 431 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1970).
49. Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116
(1973).
50. Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Socy v. Tex. Highway
Dept, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
51. Archie v. Christian, 808 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1987).
52. Id. at 1137.
53. Id. at 1138.
54. Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985).
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set out at length the district court's comments, including the berating of the
defense counsel for not stipulating that asbestos was dangerous and calling
counsel's objections "absurd" and "foolish." 55 Judge Clark noted it was not
necessary to resolve the issue but that if the same district judge, Joe J.
Fisher, was to retry the case, "sound judicial husbandry counsels that we
indicate these remarks went far beyond the bounds of exemplary trial con-
duct by the district judge."'56
IV. SUBORDINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT
Judge Clark has been careful to keep himself and his fellow judges in line
with the Supreme Court's mandates. He has twice dissented with opinion
from a denial of rehearing en banc when the panel opinion conflicted with
Supreme Court precedent or power. 57 One of these cases involved a federal
district court's local rule requiring a six-member jury in civil cases. 58 Ac-
cording to Judge Clark, only the Supreme Court has this rulemaking
power. 59 And while expressing his dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule,
the judge has recognized that only the Supreme Court can define a change in
that area.6° In one case the en banc majority held that substantial compli-
ance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was sufficient
despite a Supreme Court holding that any noncompliance with Rule 11 con-
stitutes reversible error.61 Judge Clark wrote for four dissenting Judges that
the "question is not whether we like Rule 11 or would have written it in its
present form."' 62 He went on to say: "[ilt is not meet for an inferior Court




One rather noteworthy criminal law case, United States v. Garber,6 4 raised
the novel question of whether income derived from the sale of one's blood
plasma is taxable. The specific issue involved was the mens rea of the de-
fendant. The court en bane reversed the conviction, ostensibly because the
trial court refused to hear the defendant's expert testify that the funds were
not taxable. 65 This, Judge Clark wrote, obscured the defendant's contention
55. Id. at 471-73.
56. Id. at 473.
57. United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973) (remanding for determination
of validity of lower courts authorization procedures for wiretapping); Cooley v. Strickland
Transp. Co., 459 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1972) (affirming the constitutional validity of a regional
rule mandating a six-member panel for civil cases), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 723 (1973).
58. Cooley, 459 F.2d at 779-80.
59. Id. at 790 (Clark, J., dissenting).
60. Robinson, 472 F.2d at 977 (Clark, J., dissenting).
61. United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 939-40 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
904 (1980).
62. Id. at 948 (Clark, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 950.
64. 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979).
65. Id. at 97.
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that she could not have intentionally evaded a tax that was not due.6 6 One
cannot ignore, however, Judge Clark's personal views on the case, expressed
in his dissent to the panel's affirmance of the conviction:
The absence of proper proof to establish her [tax] base heightens my
nonjudicial yet serious doubts as to the wisdom of the government's
choice to prosecute ... [defendant] criminally in this case of first im-
pression. I am sure, however, that I do not want the affirmance of her
conviction on my judicial record. I respectfully dissent. 67
This may have been as much a reason for the en banc majority decision as
that enunciated in the opinion.
VI. GIVING ADVICE
Judge Clark has never been one to waste advice on those who were free to
disregard it. Thus, he dissented in part when a panel majority sought to
advise the Secretary of Health & Human Services how to handle future
claims, after the panel had concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the
appeal. 68 "Because the district court and this court are without jurisdiction,
we are also without power or right to comment on the methods or proce-
dures to be followed by the Secretary in the future handling of these
claims." 69
On the other hand, when addressing district courts over which the Fifth
Circuit has supervisory authority, Judge Clark is not reluctant to give ad-
vice. Bryan v. US. 70 involved procedure under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, for acceptance of guilty pleas. The en banc majority
denied relief to the defendant, 71 who claimed that even though he had told
the trial court that there was no plea bargain, there was in fact a plea bargain
that was not kept. The opinion adopts a prospective rule specifying Rule 11
procedures. 72
Although usually insistent on deciding the case before the court only,
Judge Clark could not ignore the press of asbestosis suits and their national
implication. In Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,73 Judge Clark criti-
cized the en banc majority and his own prior opinion for the panel74 for
failing to recognize that the case will "control the rights of untold thousands
of litigants in this court."'75 Judge Clark wrote that the only just resolution
was for the U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether federal common law
should be developed to address liability and punitive damage issues.76
66. Id. at 97-100.
67. United States v. Garber, 589 F.2d 843, 850 (5th Cir. 1979) (Clark, J., dissenting).
68. Tex. Medical Ass'n v. Sullivan, 875 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1984).
69. Id. at 1174 (Clark, J., dissenting).
70. 492 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1974).
71. Id. at 781-82.
72. Id. at 780-81.
73. 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
74. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1984).
75. 750 F.2d at 1329.




In Sargent v. Genesco, Inc. 77 Judge Clark wrote an unusually long (sixteen
page) opinion for a unanimous panel. Although the case has but one opin-
ion, it is worthy of discussion since the opinion deals with one important
issue of securities law. After disposing of statute of limitations and privity
issues, Judge Clark addressed the more difficult question of whether plain-
tiffs under rule lOb-5 of must be purchasers or sellers of stock. Distinguish-
ing two Supreme Court cases, Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life78
and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States79, Judge Clark reaffirmed the
"purchaser-seller requirement in this circuit."80 The next year, Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores"' came down, confirming the rule Judge Clark
enforced.
In another opinion on rule lOb-5, Judge Clark dissented from an award of
exemplary damages.8 2 However, he later wrote the opinion for an en banc
majority that expanded rule lOb-5 recovery by adopting a fraud on the mar-
ket theory to enable a plaintiff who never read the offering circular to main-
tain a cause of action where the alleged fraud gave the security
marketability.8 3
VIII. SCHOOL SEGREGATION
When Judge Clark was appointed, the Fifth Circuit was still addressing
segregation in southern schools. The Fifth Circuit did not enjoy support
from the Supreme Court on the issue of school desegregation, as a review of
three cases will show.
In United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education,8 4 the trial
court had ordered desegregation, and the Fifth Circuit modified the order to
eliminate its rigidity. The Supreme Court reversed and directed the court of
appeals to affirm the district court's order without modification. 85 Justice
Black, speaking for a unanimous court, was kind in his treatment of the
court below:
The modifications ordered by the panel of the Court of Appeals, while
of course not intended to do so, would, we think, take from the order
some of its capacity to expedite by means of specific commands, the day
when a completely unified, unitary, nondiscriminatory school system
becomes a reality instead of a hope .... [T]here is no sign of lack of
interest in the cause of either justice or education in the views main-
tained by any of the parties or in the orders entered by either of the
77. 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
78. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
79. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
80. Sargent, 492 F.2d at 764.
81. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
82. Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920
(1973).
83. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
84. 395 U.S. 225 (1969).




Montgomery County was decided on June 2, 1969, near the end of the
Court's 1968 October Term. Then came Alexander v. Holmes County Board
of Education,87 argued on October 23, 1969, and decided six days later. The
only change on the Court was the retirement of Chief Justice Warren and
the appointment of Chief Justice Burger. The brief per curiam opinion indi-
cates the fact situation and the court's increasing impatience with delays in
desegregation. The five-sentence opinion is quoted here in full:
This case comes to the Court on a petition for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The petition was granted on October 9,
1969, and the case set down for early argument. The question
presented is one of paramount importance, involving as it does the de-
nial of fundamental rights to many thousands of school children, who
are presently attending Mississippi schools under segregated conditions
contrary to the applicable decisions of this Court. Against this back-
ground the Court of Appeals should have denied all motions for addi-
tional time because continued operation of segregated schools under a
standard of allowing "all deliberate speed" for desegregation is no
longer constitutionally permissible. Under explicit holdings of this
Court the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school
systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary
schools.""
The next school desegregation case to come before the Fifth Circuit was
Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District"g, decided December
1, 1969. The court, in a unanimous en banc decision, attempted to imple-
ment the Supreme Court's Alexander v. Holmes County rule,90 noting that
that decision "sent the doctrine of deliberate speed to its final resting
place." 9 ' The court ordered that a two-step desegregation plan be imple-
mented. 92 The first step, scheduled to take place before February 1, 1970,
included everything but a merger of student bodies. The second step, the
student body merger, was to occur before the beginning of the Fall 1970
school term. The order applied to thirteen consolidated appeals, embracing
counties in Mississippi, Texas, Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia and Florida -
every state included in the Fifth Circuit. 93 The Court of Appeals disap-
proved plans that had not resulted in desegregation or that allowed too
much time to desegregate. 94 In all but two cases the court reversed the hold-
ings of district courts involved. 95 Shortening the time allowed for filing ap-
peals and briefs to the court and denying any stay pending petitions for
rehearing or certiorari, the court sought to eliminate any possible delay in
86. Id. at 235, 236.
87. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
88. Id. at 20 (citations and order omitted).
89. 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.) rev'd, 396 U.S. 290 (1969).
90. Alexander, 396 U.S. at 20-21.
91. Singleton, 419 F.2d at 1216.
92. Id. at at 1217.
93. Id. at 1219-22.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1222.
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the implementation of its orders.96 "With the ink scarcely dry" 97 on the
order, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the decision without argu-
ment in a three-sentence opinion:
Insofar as the Court of Appeals authorized deferral of student desegre-
gation beyond February 1, 1970, that Court misconstrued our holding
in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education ..... Accordingly,
the petitions for writs of certiorari are granted, the judgments of the
Court of Appeals are reversed, and the cases remanded to that court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgments in
these cases are to issue forthwith. 98
Interestingly, Justice Black sided with the majority in this case, disagree-
ing with the concurrence of Justices Harlan and White that indicated a max-
imum timetable of eight weeks for compliance with desegregation orders.99
Justice Black apparently had taken off the gloves that softened his blows in
Montgomery County. Another peculiar aspect of the Court's action is that
the opinion of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, containing the
words, "[t]o say peremptorily that the Court of Appeals erred . . . and to
direct summary reversal without argument ... seems unsound to us" is de-
nominated a "Memorandum" and not a "dissent."' 00
On January 21, 1970, one week after the Supreme Court's decision in
Carter, the Fifth Circuit adopted the high court's judgment in a short per
curiam opinion.10  Although Judge Clark agreed that the Fifth Circuit was
bound to comply with the Supreme Court's mandate, 10 2 he wrote his first
dissenting opinion. He seemed reluctant to dissent: "[o]nly the strongest
belief that the remedy imposed by today's action violates basic constitutional
rights of most of those upon whom it is fastened could induce me as a brand
new judge to set forth these comments."' a03 Two recurring themes appear in
this opinion. First, the court merely issues "another cryptic edict'" °4 in-
stead of specifying the actions required, thus giving no guidance to the lower
courts. This failure to explain the order would, in Judge Clark's opinion,
detract from the public acceptance of and respect for court decrees. 15 Sec-
ond, Judge Clark expresses his concern for the children involved, since forc-
ing reassignment of school children in the middle of a school year disrupts
that year's education and punishes the students for the lack of cooperation
by school officials. '0 6 These themes can also be found in Judge Clark's opin-
ions in other school desegregation cases.
96. Singleton, 419 F.2d at 1222.
97. United States v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 891 (1972) (description of Single-
ton by Chief Judge Brown).
98. Carter v. W. Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 396 U.S. 290, 291 (1970).
99. Id. at 293 (Harlan and White, J.J., concurring).
100. Id. at 293-94.
101. Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 425 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.), rev'd. sub
nom., Carter v. W. Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970).
102. See Judge Coleman's dissenting opinion, 425 F.2d at 1213.
103. Id. at 1217 (Clark, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1217-18.
106. See id. at 1221.
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This trilogy of Supreme Court reversals of the Fifth Circuit certainly did
not end the problem of desegregation. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit later saw on
five separate occasions some of the very cases which had been consolidated
in Singleton."°7
Judge Clark had four other opportunities in 1970 to write an opinion in
school desegregation cases. The first came when the Fifth Circuit refused to
stay an order requiring reassignment of pupils in Harvest v. Board of Public
Instruction.'0 8 The order was enforced despite the fact that only fifty-four
days of school remained in the 1969-1970 school term. Judge Clark dis-
sented, noting that the only "right" protected by this order is the right to
"enforced racial integration,"c°9 a right found neither in the constitution nor
in any statute. Judge Clark noted that the children were being penalized for
the delays of the school officials, adding that "[w]hat is being taken away
from these children by approving this order is the very right nominally en-
forced, the right to equal educational opportunity."' " 0 The judge pointed
out the irony in affording countless rights to criminals but denying such at-
tention to innocent children." '
The same case came before the same panel again three months later." 2
This time, since the school year had ended, Judge Clark concurred in the
court's approval of the district court's plan. Clarifying the basis of his previ-
ous dissent, Judge Clark stated that "the welfare of the children has to be the
paramount consideration." ' 13
Then in Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District," 14 a panel
of the Fifth Circuit reversed a plan adopted by the trial court in favor of a
more disruptive plan that would accomplish the establishment of a unitary
system." 1 5 Judge Clark dissented from the denial of a rehearing en bane.16
He pointed out that this case had been handled extraordinarily, as most
school cases were being handled, without adequate briefing time, without
oral argument, and without the conference of the judges on the panel." 7
Emphasizing that the court misconceived again the true goal of desegrega-
tion - equal right to education, not equal numbers of racial groups in every
school building" 18 - Judge Clark argued for en banc review of such an im-
107. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 432 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1970); Wright v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction,
431 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1970); Youngblood v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 430 F.2d 625 (5th Cir.
1970); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1970); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Sepa-
rate Sch. Dist., 426 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1970), mandate modified by 430 F. 2d 368 (5th Cir.
1970).
108. 425 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1970).
109. Id. at 1224 (Clark, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1225.
111. Id.
112. Harvest v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 429 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
943 (1971).
113. Id. at 416.
114. 433 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1970).
115. Id. at 395.
116. Id. at 398 (Clark, J., dissenting).




portant issue, especially since the panel decision was inconsistent with prior
panel decisions." 9
The fourth 1970 opinion of Judge Clark in a school desegregation case
was in Ross v. Eckels.' 20 In this case, the panel majority modified the dis-
trict court's equidistant zoning plan by pairing certain schools, so that
"more" desegregation would be accomplished. 121 Judge Clark dissented, ob-
jecting to the substitution of the court's judgment for that of the trial judge
who had contact with the situation. 1 22 He repeated his criticism, voiced ear-
lier in Singleton, that the court was not giving any help to the school districts
and trial courts in defining a unitary system.' 23 And he again reminded the
reader that what is at stake are the rights of the children, parents and teach-
ers1 24. "[T]he courts are totally inadequate as an institution to deal with
such numerous and complex interrelationships of rights on a comprehensive
basis."' 25 The judge thus repeated his distaste for the expedited way in
which "school cases" were being handled.' 26 He added: "[r]esignation to
my fate as a dissenter cannot overcome my remorse for those whose rights
our edicts trample in wholesale lots.' 1 27
So ended the rash of school desegregation cases of 1970. Judge Clark's
approach to these cases exhibits a concern for implementing desegregation
without disrupting education. He opposed cryptic opinions that resulted
from hurried procedures, and he kept in mind the objective: protection of
the rights of children, black and white, to educational opportunity. In Judge
Clark's own words, his concern was to insure that desegregation plans pre-
serve "a disciplined atmosphere in which a meaningful education for pupils
of both races . . . [is] afforded."' 128 The judge was often alone in voicing
these concerns, and indeed, sometimes these concerns ran contrary to a lit-
eral reading of the Supreme Court's orders. But, as Chief Judge Brown
wrote, judges on the courts of appeal have a "duty to decide - not just
rubber stamp after getting the word from Mount Olympus.' 29 And Judge
Clark sought to decide cases rather than avoid them by brief per curiam
opinions or denials of rehearings en banc.
A different school issue arose in 1981. Judge Clark, a native of Mississippi
and a graduate of its state schools, was called upon in Hogan v. Mississippi
University for Women 130 to determine whether the state, by maintaining a
school for women only, violated a male applicant's equal protection rights.
119. Henry, 433 F.2d at 399-400.
120. 434 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1970).
121. Id. at 1148.
122. Id. at 1149 (Clark, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1150.
125. Ross, 434 F.2d at 1151 (Clark, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 1150-51.
127. Id.
128. Bell v. W. Point Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 446 F.2d 1362, 1363 (5th Cir. 1971).
129. United States v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 891 (5th Cir. 1972).
130. 646 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1981).
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He held that it did.' 31 The Supreme Court affirmed 132 in an opinion written
by Justice O'Connor for a bare 5-4 majority, over a long and eloquent dis-
sent by Justice Powell. Powell's dissent notes that coeducation is a recent
phenomena, and that single-sex schools have a long and respected history. 1
33
Judge Clark had noted that such an argument, when placed in a racial con-
text, would quickly fall. 134
IX. EIGHTH AMENDMENT
One of the most important habeas corpus cases in which Judge Clark par-
ticipated was the case of R ummel v. Estelle. 135 William James Rummel was
convicted of obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses in 1973. He had been
convicted of two prior felonies, so he was sentenced to life imprisonment
under the Texas Habitual Offender Statute. These three felonies were all
property crimes; none involved violence or force. After exhausting his state
remedies, Rummel applied for federal habeas corpus relief. Rummel
claimed that the statute, admittedly valid on its face, was applied to him in
violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. Judge Clark agreed with Rummel and wrote the opinion for
the panel majority, reversing the trial court's denial of relief.136 When the
majority of the en banc court reversed the panel, Judge Clark penned the
dissent for six judges. 137 In March of 1980, the Supreme Court affirmed the
denial of habeas relief.138 Ironically, the Supreme Court later adopted Judge
Clark's reasoning 139 and Rummel was released from the Texas Department
of Corrections later in 1980.140
This case raised many difficult questions. While states, as sovereigns, are
supposed to have great latitude in enacting and enforcing criminal statutes,
131. Id. at 1119.
132. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
133. Id. at 736-39.
134. Hogan, 646 F.2d at 1118-19.
135. Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Rummel 1].
136. Id. at 1200.
137. Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 665 (5th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Rummel 2].
138. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) [hereinafter Rummel 3].
139. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). The court there held a life sentence without
possibility of parole was violative of the Eighth Amendment when applied to a seven-time
petty offender. Id. at 303. The majority distinguished Rummel. Id. at 297. Chief Justice Bur-
ger, dissenting, said the majority holding "cannot rationally be reconciled with Rummel." Id.
at 304. Last term the Supreme Court completely confounded the subject by issuing three
opinions that address Solem: two Justices say Solem is wrong, three others say it is correct but
should be limited, four others say it is correct. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680, at 2684,
2702, 2709 (1991).
140. Rummel had in fact two issues in his habeas petition - the Eighth Amendment claim
and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The en banc court remanded the second claim
to the panel, Rummel 2, 587 F.2d at 662, which in turn vacated and remanded for a hearing on
this issue, 590 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1979). The district court found for Rummel on this claim
and granted the writ of habeas corpus. Rummel v. Estelle, 498 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Tx. 1980).
Rummel was not retried, but instead pleaded guilty to the third offense for time served and was
released in November of 1980. He soon moved out of the State of Texas. (Statement of Scott
J. Atlas, court appointed counsel for Rummel on his habeas petition.)
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the federal Constitution does provide some restraints. 141 This issue of feder-
alism was quite important in the case.
The Supreme Court has had some trouble in invalidating death penalties
as disproportionate to the crime charged.142 Invalidating a life sentence as
disproportionate is more of an intrusion into the province of state legisla-
tures. Judge Clark, in his opinion for the panel majority in Rummel, ac-
knowledged the "tension between an inquiry into legislative purpose and the
need for federal courts to avoid substituting their discretionary judgment for
that of the states."' 43 Nevertheless, the panel held that Rummel's offenses
were hardly worthy of the penultimate penalty.144 In so holding, the court
pointed to the "irrational severity"1 45 of Rummel's sentence, comparing it to
other sentences in Texas and to sentences in other states for similar
crimes.14 6 Judge Clark recognized that if requiring states to be subordinate
to the federal government in areas traditionally left to state law hampers a
state's sovereignty, then requiring a state to conform to the rules of other
states is even more of an imposition.14 7 Judge Clark claimed, however, that
the court was not demanding conformity. 14 8 But the result of his opinion
and the full text of footnote thirteen 149 indicate that under the proportional-
ity analysis, states would be required to conform at least to those norms that
are nearly universally recognized unless they had good reason not to con-
form, e.g., a special crime problem. The court did temper its decision with
these sentences, "[w]e expressly recognize both that the prerogative to fix
sentence ranges for proscribed criminal conduct belongs to the legislative
and not the judicial branch and that it is extremely broad. We hold only
that it is not unbounded."' 150
One should not conclude that Judge Clark abandoned notions of federal-
ism in the Rummel opinion. In his dissent to the full court's reversal of the
panel, Judge Clark said: "The petitioner's punishment is [excessive]... even
with the greatest deference to the state's legitimate interests.' 15' The ques-
tion is not whether the Eighth Amendment limits legislative power to punish
141. Rummel 1, 568 F.2d at 1200.
142. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death sentence for
the crime of rape is grossly disproportional and excessive punishment, and is therefore forbid-
den by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment).
143. Rummel 1, 568 F.2d at 1198.
144. Id. at 1199-1200.
145. Id. at 1199.
146. Id. at 1199-1200.
147. Id. at 1200 n.13.
148. Rummel 1, 568 F.2d at 1200 n.13.
149. Id.
This is not a search for a norm or a demand for conformity in these diverse
jurisdictions. Some states might validly impose an uncustomarily harsh sen-
tence for an offense not regarded so seriously in others where it has a larger
interest in controlling that deviation. It also may impose a stiffer penalty where
an offense, non-serious in itself, forms part of a pattern of conduct which is a
particular problem for that state. Crimes involving dangerous drugs may fall in
this category. None of Rummel's offenses presents such an interest.
Id.
150. Id. at 1200.
151. Rummel 2, 587 F.2d at 670 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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crime, for it clearly does. 152 The question is rather where to draw the line.
Certainly, Judge Clark's line is not as distinct as one that would apply the
Amendment only to death cases, but the distinct line is not always the cor-
rect line. Further, four Justices of the Supreme Court thought that Judge
Clark's conclusion that Rummel's sentence was unconstitutional was "com-
patible with principles of judicial restraint and federalism."'1 53
X. CONCLUSION
Judge Clark has added much to the development of the law in several
areas. More importantly, he has lent his uncompromising integrity to a fed-
eral judiciary that is increasingly in need of such support. He has lived by
the motto hanging on his office wall and which hung in his father's law
office:
For When the One Great Scorer
Comes to Write Against Your Name,
He Writes Not That You Won or Lost,
But How You Played the Game.
152. See Rummel 1, 568 F.2d at 1202 (Thornberry, J., dissenting).
153. Rummel 3, 445 U.S. at 287.
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